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Perceptual Load Affects Eyewitness
Accuracy and Susceptibility to
Leading Questions
Gillian Murphy1* and Ciara M. Greene2
1 School of Applied Psychology, University College Cork, Cork, Ireland, 2 School of Psychology, University College Dublin,
Dublin, Ireland
Load Theory (Lavie, 1995, 2005) states that the level of perceptual load in a task (i.e.,
the amount of information involved in processing task-relevant stimuli) determines the
efficiency of selective attention. There is evidence that perceptual load affects distractor
processing, with increased inattentional blindness under high load. Given that high load
can result in individuals failing to report seeing obvious objects, it is conceivable that load
may also impair memory for the scene. The current study is the first to assess the effect
of perceptual load on eyewitness memory. Across three experiments (two video-based
and one in a driving simulator), the effect of perceptual load on eyewitness memory was
assessed. The results showed that eyewitnesses were less accurate under high load,
in particular for peripheral details. For example, memory for the central character in the
video was not affected by load but memory for a witness who passed by the window at
the edge of the scene was significantly worse under high load. High load memories were
also more open to suggestion, showing increased susceptibility to leading questions.
High visual perceptual load also affected recall for auditory information, illustrating a
possible cross-modal perceptual load effect on memory accuracy. These results have
implications for eyewitness memory researchers and forensic professionals.
Keywords: perceptual load, eyewitness memory, attention, perception, reconstructive memory
INTRODUCTION
Selective attention is what allows us to focus on what is relevant and ignore irrelevant, potentially
distracting information. It is what allows us to navigate complex environments and is critical
for everyday functioning. This includes the ability to recall essential details after witnessing a
crime—eyewitness memory. Load Theory (Lavie and Tsal, 1994; Lavie, 1995, 2005) makes specific
predictions about the interplay of perception and awareness, stating that as perceptual capacity is
limited, when perceptual load is high, irrelevant distractors are less likely to be processed. However,
when a task incurs low perceptual load, all available stimuli are processed (including irrelevant
distractors) and selective attention takes place at a later stage. Perceptual load is defined as “the
amount of information involved in the processing of the task stimuli” (Macdonald and Lavie, 2011,
p1780). This can be operationalized by either varying the number of task-related stimuli or by
altering the task to be performed on the same stimuli. Load Theory has become a hugely influential
model of attention and there is a body of evidence to suggest that high perceptual load reduces
behavioral interference by irrelevant distractors (e.g., Lavie, 1995; Lavie and De Fockert, 2003;
Forster and Lavie, 2008; but see Khetrapal, 2010; Benoni and Tsal, 2013; Cave and Chen, 2016
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for reviews of recent studies challenging the load hypothesis).
This theoretical approach builds directly on a large body of
research in the field of selective attention, in particular efforts
to resolve conflicting accounts of when in the attentional process
distracting information is filtered out of awareness (see Murphy
et al., 2016 for a review). Much of this evidence comes from
research using variations of the Eriksen flanker task (Eriksen
and Eriksen, 1974) in which interference from a peripheral
distractor letter is reduced when the central task—a search array
containing other letters—imposes high perceptual load. This
corresponds with recent evidence that attention becomes more
spatially focused under high perceptual load so that peripheral
information is not processed to the same extent as central
information (Caparos and Linnell, 2010).
Perceptual load does not just affect distraction by irrelevant
stimuli; it also affects individuals’ subjective awareness of
such stimuli. High load induces inattentional blindness, the
phenomenon whereby people fail to notice easily visible stimuli
(see Lavie et al., 2014 for a review). Cartwright-Finch and
Lavie (2007) presented participants with a cross and asked them
to either note which arm was blue (low load) or which arm
was longer (high load), with the latter thought to consume
considerably more attentional resources than the former, as
identifying a color relies on discrimination of a single feature
(Treisman and Gelade, 1980; Cartwright-Finch and Lavie, 2007).
On a final, critical trial, an unexpected shape was also presented.
Under high perceptual load only 10% of participants reported
awareness for the shape, compared to 55% under low load.
This effect of perceptual load on awareness is not limited to
the visual domain; Macdonald and Lavie (2011) established the
phenomenon of inattentional deafness, the failure to detect an
auditory stimulus while engaged in a high visual load task. This
suggests that perceptual load can also have cross-modal effects on
attention and awareness.
Thus, there is much evidence to suggest that the processing
of irrelevant information is reduced when a central task
imposes high perceptual load. This has obvious implications for
eyewitness memory, suggesting that memories for events that
incur high perceptual load may be less accurate due to early
attentional filtering. In a related study, Rivardo et al. (2011)
manipulated attentional set and found that eyewitnesses who
experienced inattentional blindness when watching a video of a
theft were also less likely to recall other details from the video.
There is some evidence for perceptual load effects on memory.
In one study (Lavie et al., 2009), participants performed a low or
high load letter search task while attempting to ignore salient but
task-irrelevant distractors at fixation, such as a spider or a car.
Recognition for the task-irrelevant object in a surprise test was
significantly worse in the high load condition. Similar results have
been found when human faces are used as irrelevant distractors
(Jenkins et al., 2002, 2005). Though these studies suggest that
perceptual load affects memory for task-irrelevant stimuli, there
is as yet no evidence that this extends beyond artificial, computer-
based search tasks. These studies also clearly defined the objects
and faces as irrelevant and participants were instructed to ignore
them. In a naturally occurring event, eyewitnesses may not be
able to make a clear distinction between relevant and irrelevant
information. There is evidence that real world situations which
place high demands on attention can result in reduced memory
accuracy and increased suggestibility to leading questions. This is
true for when individuals are presented with attention-grabbing
stimuli such as a weapon (the “weapon-focus effect”; Pickel,
1998; Saunders, 2009) and when they are instructed to perform
a divided-attention task during encoding (Reinitz et al., 1994;
Lane, 2006). However, as in the perceptual load examples above,
these studies involve a specific manipulation (e.g., the presence
of a weapon, completion of a secondary task) that affects the
scope of attentional selection. Memory for details outside the
attentional “spotlight” is therefore impaired. We argue that
perceptual load is very different to a weapon focus effect as it
is the content of the entire scene that maxes out all available
attention capacity. When there is no obvious point around which
to “tighten the spotlight,” how then will memory be affected
by load? We hypothesize that load will detrimentally affect
memory accuracy for all details but especially stimuli in the
periphery, away from the main activity, due to the known spatial
narrowing effects of high perceptual load (Caparos and Linnell,
2010).
Finally, we will investigate the effect of post-event information
on low and high load memories. The effect of leading questions
on eyewitness reports is well established (Loftus, 2003, 2005). For
example, Loftus and Zanni (1975) showed participants a video of
a car accident and asked either “Did you see a broken headlight?”
or “Did you see the broken headlight?” The simple change from
an indefinite to a definite article increased the rate of false
positives from 7 to 18%. There is a wealth of evidence suggesting
that eyewitness memory is malleable and open to suggestion.
There is also evidence that individuals use other sources of
information to aid in the reconstruction of memories, such as
schemas and information contained in the question (Tuckey and
Brewer, 2003; Loftus, 2005). As participants will be unable to take
in all the details of a high load scene, we hypothesize that these
memories will be less complete and individuals will therefore be
more reliant on external cues to reconstruct their memory. This
may lead to increased susceptibility to post-event misinformation
and leading questions.
The Present Study
In the research reported here, we explored three key questions.
(1) Are eyewitness reports for high load events less accurate than
for low load events? (2) Does high load induce spatial narrowing,
so that peripheral details are especially affected by load? (3) Are
high load memories more susceptible to the effects of leading
questions than low load memories?
EXPERIMENT 1A
Method
Participants
During “Culture Night 2014,” an annual event in which museums
and other places of interest are open to the public, 111 visitors
(66 female) to University College Cork (UCC) School of Applied
Psychology participated in this experiment (mean age = 34.37,
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SD = 13.89). No participants were excluded from analysis and
none were added at a later date.
Materials and procedure
The study received ethical approval from UCC School of
Applied Psychology Ethics Committee. All subjects gave written
informed consent in accordance with the Declaration of
Helsinki. Participants were randomly assigned to one of four
conditions—high/low perceptual load video and regular/leading
questionnaire. In small groups (N≈15), participants viewed a
1-min video featuring a robbery. They were instructed to pay
close attention, as they would be questioned about the details.
The video showed a woman entering an office and stealing a
number of items. Midway through the video, a man walks past
the window and looks into the office for approximately 5 s
before walking off screen. There were two versions of this video,
incurring either low or high perceptual load (see Figure 1).
Perceptual load in the videos was manipulated via the number
of objects in the scene (e.g., posters on the wall, objects on the
desk, etc.). While the furniture remained constant between both
videos, the low load video contained 13 additional items and
the high load video contained 51 items, thus there are more
features to be perceived and the load on attention is increased.
The longer-term effects of load on eyewitness memory were
assessed via a follow-up questionnaire, sent to participants via
email 1 week after the experiment. However, in experiment
1A, the response rate was poor (38/111); these results are
therefore not included here but can be found in Supplementary
Material.
Immediately after viewing the video, participants completed a
22-item paper questionnaire, containing either regular or leading
questions. Twelve were filler items; the 10 critical questions are
listed in Table 1. Q1–Q6 tested memory for details of the video
and were identical in both questionnaires; these included Q4,
featuring a line-up containing the thief and four similar women,
and Q5, featuring a line-up with the witness and four similar
men (see Figure 2). The leading versions of Q7 and Q8 were
designed to influence immediate responses (e.g., to imply there
was a stapler) while Q9 and Q10 were designed to influence
memory at follow-up (e.g., to imply that the thief was wearing
a watch) and so responses to those questions were not used for
analysis of memory accuracy.
FIGURE 1 | Screenshots of the low perceptual load video (A) and the high perceptual load video (B). The thief is visible in the foreground and the witness is
visible outside the window.
TABLE 1 | List of critical questions used in the regular, leading, and follow-up questionnaires in experiment 1A and 1B.
Regular Leading Follow-up
Q1 What did the thief take? –
Q2 Did you notice any unusual objects on the desk? –
Q3 Did you notice any unusual objects on the
windowsill?
–
Q4 Thief line-up
Q5 Witness line-up
Q6 How confident are you that your memory for the
event is accurate? (1–10)
– F1. How confident are you that your memory for
the event is accurate? (1–10)
Q7 Did you see a stapler on the desk? Did you see the stapler on the desk? F2. Did you see a stapler on the desk?
Q8 How long did the thief spend in the room? e.g., 5,
10, 15 s
How long did the thief spend in the room? e.g., 1,
2, 3 min
F3. How long did the thief spend in the room?
Q9 Was the thief wearing a watch? Did the thief check the time on the watch they
were wearing?
F4. Was the thief wearing a watch?
Q10 Did the thief look in the drawers? Did the thief look in the drawers before or after
taking the objects?
F5. Did the thief look in the drawers?
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FIGURE 2 | Line-ups presented in questionnaires (Q4 and Q5) for experiment 1A and 1B. The questions were worded “Please indicate if one of the above
people was the thief/witness at the window in the video. Write A, B, C, D, E, or “none” if it was none of the above.” The correct answer for the thief (top row) is B and
the correct answer for the witness (bottom row) is E. If participants failed to respond or wrote any other response, the question was marked as incorrect.
Results
Perceptual Load
Participants were significantly less accurate under high load. Out
of a total of three items stolen (laptop, money, and chocolate),
participants correctly identified more items under low load
[M = 2.45, 95% confidence intervals (CI95) = 2.24, 2.65] than
high load [M = 1.48, CI95 = 1.29, 1.68; F(1,108) = 46.55,
p < 0.001, d = 1.31]. CI95 are calculated as M ± 1.96 (SE)
and are truncated at 0 and 100% where appropriate. Effect sizes
are reported using Cohen’s d for main effects and eta squared
for interactions. There were a number of unusual objects in the
video, both on the desk in the center of the screen (a large
bottle of soft drink, a game of Connect 4) and on the windowsill
at the periphery (a toy car, a hairdryer). We defined a central
detail as one that happens in the close vicinity of the main
character (the thief), which is to say on the desk. We defined
peripheral details as everything outside that area (including the
windows, floor, etc.). Participants were required to list any items
they remembered and answers were considered correct if one or
more item was correctly reported. Accuracy for central objects
(Q2) did not significantly differ between low load (M = 74.1%;
CI = 61.3, 86.8) and high load [M = 65.5%, CI95 = 53.1, 77.9;
F(1,108) = 0.92, p = 0.43]. However, load did have a significant
effect on peripheral objects (Q3), with recall significantly better
under low load (M = 49.8%, CI95 = 38.9, 60.7) relative to high
load [M = 9.4%, CI95 = 0, 20; F(1,107) = 27.55, p < 0.001,
d = 1.01]. Likewise, load had no effect on identification of
the thief [low load: M = 58.4%, CI95 = 44.7, 72.2; high load:
M = 49.6%, CI95 = 36.2, 63; F(1,108) = 0.82, p = 0.37] but
did reduce identification of the witness at the window (see
Figure 3A); low load (M = 61.7%, CI95 = 49.6, 73.8), high load
[M = 20.3%, CI95 = 8.3, 32.2; F(1,107) = 23.44, p < 0.001,
d = 0.93]. Load did not have a significant effect on participants’
tendency to falsely identify members of the line-up, with similar
patterns of incorrect responses (% of participants choosing the
wrong member of the line-up, participants indicating that the
target was not present and participants indicating that they
couldn’t choose/didn’t know) under low and high load. The
precise distribution of responses is available in Supplementary
Material. Participants rated themselves as marginally more
confident in the accuracy of their memory (Q6) under low load
(M = 5.46, CI95 = 4.92, 6) relative to high load (M = 4.56,
CI95 = 4.04, 5.09), but this did not survive correction for multiple
comparisons [F(1,108)= 5.59, p= 0.02].
Perceptual Load × Leading Questions
A significant interaction effect [F(1,108) = 10.66, p < 0.01,
η2 = 0.9] showed that participants were less affected by the
leading stapler question (Q7) under low load (see Figure 3B;
regular: M= 91.3% correct, CI95 = 75.4, 100; leading: M= 74.2%
correct, CI95 = 60.5, 87.9) compared to high load (regular:
M = 82.6%, CI95 = 66.7, 98.5; leading: M = 17.1%, CI95 = 4.2,
30.1). As shown in Figure 3C, the same trend was evident with
the misleading time-in-room question (Q8) with a reduced effect
under low load (regular: M = 31.87 s, CI95 = 19.7, 44; leading:
M = 51.8 s, CI95 = 41.32, 62.29) compared to high load [regular:
M = 26.7 s, CI95 = 14.6, 38.9; leading: M = 83.7 s, CI95 = 73.9,
93.1; F(1,108)= 10.71, p< 0.01, η2 = 0.9].
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FIGURE 3 | Memory accuracy under low and high perceptual load in experiment 1A, with 95% confidence intervals shown. (A) Accuracy of identification
of the thief and the witness under low and high load. (B) Accuracy in response to the regular and leading stapler question (“did you see the stapler” vs. “did you see
a stapler”) under low and high load. (C) Estimates of the time the thief spent in the room, in response to regular and leading questions under low and high load.
EXPERIMENT 1B
As response rates to the follow-up questionnaire were poor,
experiment 1A was repeated with a larger sample of university
students.
Method
Participants
A total of 270 students (181 female) from two introductory
psychology classes participated in this experiment during class
time (mean age = 20.3, SD = 4.6). Participation was anonymous
and participants were free to withdraw without penalty. All
students present in class and willing to participate were included
in the analysis and none were added at a later date. This study
was approved by the UCC School of Applied Psychology Ethics
Committee and all subjects gave written informed consent in
accordance with the Declaration of Helsinki.
Materials and Procedure
The video and questionnaires were identical to experiment 1A.
Results
Experiment 1B replicated the results of experiment 1A, finding
significantly greater accuracy for Q1, items stolen, under low
load (M = 2.47, CI95 = 2.32, 2.61) than high load [M = 1.26,
CI95 = 1.14, 1.38; F(1,265) = 160.58, p < 0.001, d = 1.56].
Memory for items on the desk (Q2) did not differ significantly
between low (M = 77.6%, CI95 = 69.7, 85.5) and high load
[M = 76.4%, CI95 = 69.8, 83; F(1,265) = 0.06, p = 0.81], while
objects on the windowsill (Q3) were recalled with significantly
more accuracy under low (M = 85.7%, CI95 = 74.4, 97.1) relative
to high load [M = 8.1%, CI95 = 0, 17.7; F(1,265) = 106.29,
p < 0.001, d = 1.27]. In line with experiment 1A, there was no
difference in the identification of the thief under low (M= 71.4%,
CI95 = 62.6, 80.3) and high load [M = 62.3%, CI95 = 54.8,
69.7; F(1,265) = 2.43, p = 0.12], while the witness was correctly
identified more often under low (M = 73.5%, CI95 = 65.1,
81.8) relative to high load [M = 28.9% CI95 = 21.9, 35.9;
F(1,265) = 64.69, p < 0.001, d = 0.99]. Participants rated
themselves as significantly more confident in the accuracy of their
memory under low load (M = 5.65, CI95 = 5.31, 6.01) relative
to high load [M = 4.64, CI95 = 4.35, 4.94; F(1,258) = 19.3,
p< 0.001, d = 0.55].
Perceptual Load × Leading Questions
As in experiment 1A, participants were less affected by leading
questions under low load but neither of these results survived
correction for multiple (8) comparisons. Participants were less
affected by the leading stapler question (Q7) under low load
(regular: M = 83%, CI95 = 70.9, 95.1; leading: M = 75.9%,
CI95 = 64.3, 87.4) compared to high load [regular: M = 58.1%,
CI95 = 47.9, 68.4; leading: M = 28.2%, CI95 = 18.7, 37.8;
F(1,266) = 4.19, p = 0.04, η2 = 0.02]. The same trend was
evident with the misleading time-in-room question (Q8) with a
reduced effect under low load (regular: M = 26.5 s, CI95 = 17.7,
35.3; leading: M = 76.1 s, CI95 = 67.8, 84.4) compared to high
load [regular: M = 25.1 s, CI95 = 17.6, 32.6; leading: M = 96 s,
CI95 = 89.1, 103; F(1,108)= 7.03, p= 0.008, η2 = 0.02].
Follow-Up
One hundred and ninety-one participants completed the
follow-up questionnaire. Forty-five were in the high load-
regular questionnaire condition, 53 were high load-leading
questionnaire, 37 were low load-regular questionnaire and 56
were low load-leading questionnaire. Confidence in memory
accuracy (F1) was not significantly affected by load at exposure:
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low load (M = 4.06, CI95 = 3.61, 4.51), high load [M = 3.65,
CI95 = 3.22, 4.08; F(1,183)= 1.71, p= 0.19, d = 0.19].
Under low load, questionnaire type had no effect on correct
answers to the stapler follow-up question; F2 (regular: M= 75.7%
correct, CI95 = 62.7, 88.7; leading: M = 76.8%, CI95 = 66.2,
87.4) while under high load the effect was greater (regular:
M = 31.1%, CI95 = 19.3, 42.9; leading: M = 7.5%, CI95 = 0,
18.4). The main effect of load was significant [F(1,187) = 93.48,
p< 0.001, d= 1.41] but the interaction did not survive correction
[F(1,187) = 4.39, p = 0.04, η2 = 0.02]. The same was true
for the time-in-room question (F3), where there was a greater
effect of leading question under high load (regular: M = 74.09 s,
CI95 = 49.3, 98.9; leading: M = 165.38 s, CI95 = 142.3, 188.47)
compared to low load (regular: M = 51.8 s, CI95 = 23.66, 79.94;
leading: M = 89.46 s, CI95 = 67, 111.91). The main effect of load
was significant [F(1,183) = 15.36, p < 0.001, d = 0.58] but the
interaction again failed to survive correction [F(1,183) = 4.58,
p= 0.03, η2 = 0.03].
For the question designed to implant false information
regarding the watch (F4), there was no difference in the effect of
the leading question under low load (regular: M = 78.4% correct,
CI95 = 63.1, 93.7; leading M = 67.9% correct, CI95 = 55.4, 80.3)
compared to high load (regular: M = 55.6% correct, CI95 = 41.7,
69.4; leading: M = 34% correct, CI95 = 21.2, 46.7). The main
effect of load was significant [F(1,187) = 16.87, p < 0.01,
d = 0.6] but the interaction was not [F(1,187) = 0.64, p = 0.42,
η2 = 0.003]. Likewise for question F5 regarding the drawers,
there was no difference in the effect of the leading question
under low load (regular: M = 62.2% correct, CI95 = 46.4, 77.9;
leading: M = 60.7% correct, CI95 = 47.9, 73.5) compared to
high load (regular: M = 48.9% correct, CI95 = 34.6, 63.2; leading
M = 28.3% correct, CI95 = 15.1, 41.5). The main effect of load
was significant [F(1,187) = 10.3, p < 0.01, d = 0.47] but the
interaction was not [F(1,187)= 1.81, p= 0.18, η2 = 0.002].
EXPERIMENT 2
The purpose of experiment 2 was to extend the findings of
experiment 1 to a more complex, realistic scenario using a driving
simulator.
Method
Participants
This study was also approved by the UCC School of Applied
Psychology Ethics Committee. All subjects gave written informed
consent in accordance with the Declaration of Helsinki.
Experiment 2 was also conducted during Culture Night, and
participants were 93 visitors to UCC (58 female), mean
age = 35.9, SD = 13.2. All participants who completed the
experiment were included in the analysis and none were added
at a later stage. All participants had a driving license and an
average of 15.8 years driving experience (SD = 13.2). Half
the participants were driving and half were passengers in the
front passenger seat. Participants were randomly assigned to
one of four conditions—high/low perceptual load drive and
regular/leading questionnaire.
Materials and Procedure
The experiment took place in UCC’s Driving Simulator
Laboratory, featuring a five-door Volkswagen Polo with manual
transmission. The simulator uses STISIM software1 and has
a 180◦ forward view created by three floor-to-ceiling screens
located 1.5 m from the car body. There is a screen behind
the vehicle which projects a rear-view simulation and there are
wing-mirror LCD display screens.
Participants drove a 3 km route along a residential street
that turned into a shopping area after approximately 2 km.
Participants were instructed to pay close attention, as they would
be asked questions immediately after the drive. As drivers entered
the retail area a jeep pulled out behind them, drove behind them
for approximately 10 s and overtook them. The jeep then crossed
through a four-way intersection and collided with a red vehicle
coming from the left. The noise of a car braking could be heard
just before the crash, and the crash itself was accompanied by
the sound of glass smashing. As the crash happened, a blue
motorcycle approached the junction from the right, stopping
before entering the intersection. Central and peripheral details
were again defined as the area around the main characters in
the scene (in this case the vehicle in front which is involved in
an accident). All other details, including other vehicles outside
of the intersection that were not involved in the crash, were
considered peripheral. There were two versions of this drive; both
featured the same buildings and vehicles and differed only in
the surface detail of objects. While the high load drive featured
colorful billboards, shop fronts, vehicles and multiple pedestrian
models, the low load drive featured plain shop fronts, black and
white billboards, silver vehicles and one pedestrian model (see
Figure 4).
Immediately after the drive, participants completed a 21-item
questionnaire; eight questions were used for analyses and the rest
were filler questions (see Table 2). There were two versions of
the questionnaire, regular and leading. Q1–Q4 tested memory
for details of the video and were identical in both questionnaires.
The leading versions of Q5 and Q6 were designed to influence
participants’ estimates of speed and duration. The leading version
of Q7 was designed to implant false information (i.e., that there
was a stop sign) and the effect was measured via Q8, which was
identical for all participants. All participants were sent a follow-
up questionnaire by email 1 week after the experiment. However,
as in experiment 1A, response rate was poor with just 34/93
responses received. Due to a lack of power, the results of the
follow-up study are not included here but are available in the
Supplementary Material.
Results
There was no effect of driver/passenger for any of the questions
and so the data presented here are the combined results for all
participants.
Perceptual Load
As shown in Figure 5A, load affected accuracy for the sound
of braking (Q3), with more correct responses under low load
1stisimdrive.com
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FIGURE 4 | Screenshots of the shopping area in the high load (A) and low load (B) driving tasks. Pictured is the jeep that is about to be involved in the
accident at the crossroads under the billboards.
TABLE 2 | Regular and leading questions for experiment 2.
Regular Leading
Q1 Were there traffic lights above the intersection? –
Q2 What was the vehicle to the right of the intersection? –
Q3 Did you hear a car braking before or after the noise of the crash? –
Q4 How confident are you that your memory for the event is accurate? (1–10) –
Q5 How fast was the red car going when it made contact with the jeep? How fast was the red car going when it smashed into the jeep?
Q6 How long was the jeep behind you before it overtook you? e.g., 5, 10, 15 s How long was the jeep behind you before it overtook you? e.g., 1, 2, 3 min
Q7 How fast was the jeep going when it reached the intersection? How fast was the jeep going when it ran the stop sign and reached the intersection?
Q8 Did you see a stop sign for the jeep?
(M = 84.6%, CI95 = 70.7, 98.4) than high load [M = 51.9%,
CI95 = 39.7, 64.2; F(1, 89) = 12.32, p < 0.01, d = 0.74]. Load
also significantly affected accuracy for peripheral details (Q2: the
vehicle to the right of the intersection), with greater accuracy
under low load (M = 45.2%, CI95 = 33.3, 57.2) than high load
[M = 9.6%, CI95 = 0, 20.2; F(1,89)= 19.63, p< 0.001, d = 0.94].
However, there was no significant difference in accuracy for
central details (Q1: traffic lights at the intersection) between low
load (M = 82.3%, CI95 = 69.3, 95.3) and high load [M = 73.1%,
CI95 = 61.6, 85; F(1,89)= 1.21, p= 0.29]. Confidence in memory
accuracy (Q4) was not significantly affected by load at exposure:
low load (M = 4.1, CI95 = 3.4, 4.8), high load [M = 4, CI95 = 3.3,
4.6; F(1,88)= 0.06, p= 0.81, d = 0.06].
Perceptual Load × Leading Questions
For the speed-of-the-red-car question (Q5), there was a greater
effect of question type under high load (regular: M = 22.7 km/h,
CI95 = 14.2, 31.3; leading: M = 71.9 km/h, CI95 = 63.2, 80.7)
compared to low load [regular: M = 30 km/h, CI95 = 20, 40;
leading: M = 40.5 km/h, CI95 = 31.5, 49.5; F(1,75) = 17.95,
p < 0.001, η2 = 0.19], as shown in Figure 5B. For Q6, regarding
the time the jeep was traveling behind them, there was a greater
effect of the leading question under high load (regular: M = 7.4 s,
CI95 = 4.4, 10.3; leading: M= 26.2 s, CI95 = 23.3, 29.1) compared
to low load (regular: M = 7.8 s, CI95 = 4.7, 10.9; leading:
M= 19.7 s, CI95 = 16.6, 22.8), however, this interaction effect did
not survive correction for multiple comparisons [F(1,73) = 5.23,
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FIGURE 5 | Results from experiment 2 examining (A) cross-modal load effect of the low and high load drives, (B) the effect of a leading question
about the speed of the red car, under low and high load.
p = 0.03, η2 = 0.07]. Finally the stop-sign question (Q8) was not
significantly affected by load, with similar responses under low
load (regular: M = 15.8% false positives, CI95 = 0, 35.2; leading:
M = 54.5% false positives, CI95 = 36.5, 72.6) and high load
(regular: M = 30.8% false positives, CI95 = 14.2, 47.4; leading:
M = 88.5% false positives, CI95 = 71.9, 100). The main effect of
load was significant [F(1,89) = 7.52, p < 0.001, d = 0.58] but the
interaction was not [F(1,89)= 1.13, p= 0.29, η2 = 0.01].
DISCUSSION
These experiments provide evidence that perceptual load affects
eyewitness memory accuracy. High perceptual load events were
recalled with less accuracy and these memories were more
malleable, with recall strongly affected by leading questions.
Experiments 1A and 1B provide evidence for these effects using a
similar paradigm to most eyewitness memory research: a video
of a simulated crime. The results of experiment 2 suggest that
perceptual load may also affect memories for complex, real world
events such as road traffic accidents. Interestingly, confidence
ratings did not consistently differ for low and high load
conditions across the three studies. This suggests that although
participants in the high load condition were significantly less
accurate in their recall, they were not necessarily aware of the
deficit in their memory.
This study has clear implications for Load Theory, providing
novel evidence that perceptual load affects everyday behavior.
Scenes imposing high perceptual load consumed eyewitnesses’
attentional capacity and thus they could not take in every detail,
resulting in less accurate memories and greater susceptibility
to leading questions. Participants who had viewed the high
perceptual load scenes were more likely to report the presence
of items that were not in fact in the scene (e.g., a stapler or a
stop sign) and their judgments of time and speed were more
influenced by subtle suggestion. In line with our hypotheses,
participants’ recall of peripheral stimuli (but not central stimuli)
was significantly impaired under high perceptual load. This was
true for both inanimate objects and for human faces, and is in line
with previous research suggesting that perceptual load restricts
the attentional spotlight (Caparos and Linnell, 2010).
Experiment 2 manipulated perceptual load by varying the
complexity of objects along the route, rather than altering the
task requirements for drivers. This load manipulation is simple
and naturally occurring. Our findings suggest that eyewitness
accounts for accidents on colorful, high perceptual load streets
are likely less accurate and more open to suggestion. The cross-
modal load effect observed in experiment 2 also has implications
for driver safety and eyewitness reports. That such naturally
occurring visual perceptual load impaired recall of a driving-
relevant sound (the screech of sudden, sharp braking) suggests
that it is not just visual attention that is affected by visual load.
This is in line with “inattentional deafness” research (Macdonald
and Lavie, 2011) but is the first evidence of such an effect in a
realistic task.
One criticism of existing research on awareness under load
is that experimenters typically use surprise post-trial questions
about an unexpected or to-be-ignored stimulus. This raises the
possibility that load effects arise as a result of rapid forgetting or
“inattentional amnesia” (Wolfe, 1999) for the unexpected, weakly
encoded stimulus. In the current experiments, participants were
expressly told to pay attention to all details in the scene, as they
would be questioned afterward and they were not asked to engage
in any secondary task to divide their attention. This provides
stronger support for Load Theory as the resulting perceptual
load effects can be said to have arisen because participants
had reached the limits of their attention capacity, not due to
participants successfully ignoring stimuli that they have been told
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are irrelevant. This is important because there is a distinction
between choosing to ignore irrelevant stimuli in a top-down
fashion, and prioritizing central information because of bottom-
up factors.
We have established the generality of our findings via different
sets of rich materials, different load manipulations and by
testing both university and general public samples, however, one
limitation of this study is that the levels of load imposed by the
two tasks were assumed to be low and high, and we intentionally
used only materials depicting both extremes. As load is difficult to
objectively quantify, we are essentially comparing lower load with
higher load. But where our “low” and “high” load materials may
rest on a continuum from absolute zero load to extremely high
load is impossible to say. We do not know, for example, the exact
point between a blank suburban street and a busy shopping area
at which load begins to affect memory. Here, we implicitly assume
a dichotomy based on previous research but in reality we do not
know what effect moderate load may have on memory. Future
research ought to examine the incremental transition from low
to high load to further explore this issue.
One area where the issue of perceptual load may have a
significant impact is in the case of child witnesses. Research
has shown that young children demonstrate reduced memory
accuracy and increased susceptibility to leading questions relative
to adults (Goodman and Reed, 1986; Bruck and Ceci, 1999)
and have a much smaller perceptual capacity that increases
with age (Huang-Pollock et al., 2002; Couperus, 2011). The
effect of perceptual load on attention may therefore have a
disproportionate effect on children, and should be taken into
consideration in future child memory studies.
As briefly mentioned in the introduction to this paper, there
are valid criticisms of load theory and there are alternative
hypotheses that seek to explain the results commonly found
using load paradigms. Further research is needed to expand the
scope of perceptual load research, particularly using ecologically
valid paradigms, to assess the role of load in everyday attention.
However, one competing theory, which is particularly relevant
to the current study is that of attentional focus (see Cave and
Chen, 2016 for a review). Chen and Cave (2016) have shown that
when load is held constant, manipulating attentional focus can
produce the same pattern of results seen in load experiments.
Conversely, when attentional focus is held constant and load
is manipulated, load effects are eliminated. Given the effect of
the high load stimuli on memory for peripheral details in the
current study, it is possible that attentional focus is an underlying
factor. Future studies could attempt to isolate load and attentional
focus to assess the effects on eyewitness memory. Similarly,
future research could also examine eyewitnesses’ performance
using eye-tracking technology to assess whether visual search
strategies are significantly different under high load (i.e., that
participants do not look at the male witness in the video) or
whether the results are simply the effect of reduced attention
capacity (i.e., participants “look but do not see”). This is an
important distinction in terms of understanding the mechanisms
driving the memory effects observed in the current study.
The current research proposes perceptual load as a novel factor
in determining eyewitness accuracy and ability to withstand
misinformation, despite not greatly reducing eyewitness’
confidence in their memory. Though it is possible to generate
many applied forensic recommendations from these studies
(e.g., that law enforcement officials ought to consider the level
of visual and auditory load when evaluating eyewitness reports)
most of these are difficult to implement given the current state of
perceptual load literature. Load remains a subjective term that
has not been objectively defined, and is therefore impossible
to accurately measure (Murphy et al., 2016). As we cannot
quantify load, it remains impossible to use the likely perceptual
load of a scene to make inferences regarding the reliability or
suggestibility of an eyewitness. However, we can conclude that
perceptual load is an important factor in memory accuracy
and eyewitness suggestibility. Though current efforts to use
this finding in applied contexts are hampered by the lack of
operational definitions, this area remains an exciting one, which
may someday prove beneficial in the real world.
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